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China is reforming its banking system, partially privatizing and permitting 
minority foreign ownership of three of the dominant ‘big four’ state-owned banks. 
This paper seeks to help predict the effects of this change by analysing the 
efficiency of virtually all Chinese banks in the years 1994–2003. Our findings 
suggest the big four banks are by far the least efficient and foreign banks the most 
efficient while minority foreign ownership is associated with significantly 
improved efficiency. We present corroborating robustness checks and offer 
several credible mechanisms through which minority foreign owners can increase 
Chinese bank efficiency. These findings suggest that minority foreign ownership 
of the big four is likely to significantly improve performance. 
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Pankkien omistus ja tehokkuus Kiinassa: 
mitä muutoksia edessä? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 16/2007 
Allen N. Berger – Iftekhar Hasan – Mingming Zhou 




Kiina on uudistamassa pankkijärjestelmäänsä yksityistämällä osittain neljä suurin-
ta valtioenemmistöistä pankkiaan siten, että se sallii ulkomaalaisten niihin tekemät 
vähemmistösijoitukset. Näiden vaikutusten ennustamisen helpottamiseksi tässä 
tutkimuksessa analysoidaan lähes kaikkien kiinalaispankkien tehokkuutta vuosina 
1994–2003. Tulosten perusteella selvästi tehottomimpia ovat neljä suurinta pank-
kia, tehokkaimpia ovat ulkomaiset pankit ja merkittävästi tehokkuuttaan ovat pa-
rantaneet ulkomaalaisessa vähemmistöomistuksessa olevat pankit. Tehokkuuden 
johtuminen muista syistä on suljettu pois tarkistamalla tulosten virhesietoisuus. 
Tutkimuksessa esitetään useita keinoja, joilla ulkomaalaiset vähemmistöomistajat 
voivat lisätä kiinalaisten pankkien tehokkuutta. Vähemmistöosuuksiin perustuva 
ulkomaalaisomistus tulee lisäksi todennäköisesti merkittävästi parantamaan neljän 
suurimman pankin tehokkuutta. 
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China’s economy has been growing about 10% per year in real terms over the last 
decade, and is projected by some to become the world’s largest economy in the 
coming decades. This rapid growth may be largely linked to the globalization of 
trade, but China has yet to ‘globalize’ its banking sector. Chinese banking is 
dominated by four very large state-owned banks – the ‘Big Four’ – with about 
three-fourths of industry assets, and very few foreign banks. As well, China’s 
legal and financial systems are not well developed – even by the standards of most 
developing nations. 
  Research on developing nations and on the finance-growth nexus strongly 
suggests that the observed high growth rates cannot continue indefinitely without 
significant reform of the banking system and the legal/financial infrastructure. 
The banking research suggests that state ownership is associated with low 
efficiency, restricted access to credit for SMEs, and slow economic growth in 
developing nations. This literature also suggests that foreign bank ownership and 
relatively unrestricted foreign bank entry are associated with higher efficiency and 
SME credit availability in developing nations. 
  The finance-growth nexus literature consistently finds that economic growth 
in developing nations is highly positively related to more efficient legal systems 
and better financial market development (eg, King and Levine 1993, La Porta et al 
1998, Djankov et al 2003, Beck et al 2005, Jappelli et al 2005). Recent findings 
also suggest that elements of the legal/financial infrastructure may have important 
effects on the abilities of banks to use ‘hard’ information lending technologies – 
such as loans based on financial statements, credit scores or easily-valued fixed 
assets pledged as collateral – to extend credit to SMEs (eg, Qian and Strahan, 
2005; Berger and Udell, 2006). 
  China has maintained high growth in spite of these problems in part because 
of the excess of funds available for investment. Very high savings rates and trade 
surpluses in recent years have yielded a surplus of funding that is currently used to 
invest in foreign securities (eg, US Treasuries), as well as foreign direct 
investment (eg, the IBM deal). Thus, efficient allocation of funding within China 
may not have been as necessary as in other funds-starved developing nations 
because there were more than enough funds available to invest in China. 
However, it seems unlikely that such large imbalances will persist and be 
sufficient to allow for the combination of poor credit allocation and high growth 
to continue indefinitely. 
  A recent study also suggests that most of the growth has been concentrated in 
what we might call the ‘private, unlisted sector’ – firms that are not state-
controlled or publicly listed. Using survey information on Chinese entrepreneurs 
and executives, the study also finds that that firms in this sector accessed funding  
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through alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms, including 
those based on ‘soft’ information from reputations and relationships (Allen et al, 
2005). It also seems unlikely that high growth for the Chinese economy can 
persist indefinitely based in substantial part on alternative funding means for just 
this one sector of the economy. While a withering of the state-controlled sector 
may not harm long-term economic growth, the listed sector will likely need to 
grow significantly using standard ‘hard’ information funding methods (eg, public 
debt and equity offerings, bank loans based on collateral) in the long run. 
  Another recent analysis suggests that an inefficient banking sector and poor 
legal/financial infrastructure may already be restraining growth and development 
in China. The research finds that access to external finance in the form of bank 
loans is important to reinvestment of profits by Chinese firms (Cull and Xu, 
2005). The authors also find that key elements of the legal/financial infrastructure 
– contract enforcement, private ownership, and expropriation risk – are additional 
important determinants of reinvestment. Such profit reinvestment may grow in 
importance for capital deepening when surplus funds are less available. 
  Reform of the Chinese banking industry is also important because of the size 
of this industry and its level of inefficiency. The banking industry is larger than 
the stock markets in China, and as shown below, is very inefficient – particularly 
the Big Four banks. 
  There has been significant reform of the banking system since entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Recent news suggests that this reform 
may now be resulting in substantial bank ownership changes with important 
implications for the future of Chinese bank efficiency. During 2005 and early 
2006, three of the Big Four banks – China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of 
China (BOC), and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – announced 
plans to partially privatize and take on minority foreign ownership. These deals 
were consummated in 2006. The foreign investors include financial organizations 
with global reach (eg, Citigroup, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of 
Scotland). In some cases, these global banks joined forces with regional financial 
organizations (eg, Temasek of Singapore) and/or with international corporate 
giants (eg, IBM). 
  While these banks are opening up to foreigners as minority owners, they are 
also going public with sales of some of their shares through IPOs, while retaining 
majority state-owned bank status. The three Big Four banks that took on minority 
foreign ownership also had very large IPOs following the initial foreign 
investments. These IPOs totaled over US $40 billion in receipts, including the 
world’s largest ever IPO offering by ICBC. The minority foreign investments may 
be related to the subsequent IPOs in that strategic minority foreign owners may 
mandate or encourage the banks to go public to increase the investors’ future 
liquidity, to improve the accuracy and transparency of the banks’ financial 
records, and/or to bring additional market discipline on the institutions. The  
9 
minority foreign investment may also serve as a quality signal to the capital 
market, increasing the revenue per share in the IPOs. The remaining Big Four 
bank, Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), is currently restructuring its problem 
loans – presumably as part of a plan to take on minority foreign owners and/or 
engage in an IPO in the near future. 
  Unfortunately, the extant research is missing some analyses that are needed to 
address the likely future efficiency effects of these changes and other potential 
reductions in state bank ownership and increases in foreign bank ownership in 
China. First, there is very little research evidence on Chinese bank efficiency. The 
few studies have mixed or contradictory results on the relative efficiency of the 
Big Four banks and on the effects of prior regulatory reforms. As well, none to 
our knowledge have used the comprehensive concept of profit efficiency nor have 
they addressed issues of foreign ownership, making it difficult to extrapolate to 
the likely effects of partial privatization and minority foreign ownership of the Big 
Four and other large Chinese banks. 
  Second, we are unaware of prior research using data from any nation on the 
effects of minority foreign ownership of banks, although there are studies of 
minority foreign ownership of nonbanking firms in developing nations.
1 While 
results on majority foreign ownership may be extrapolated to draw inferences 
about minority foreign ownership, it remains unclear whether minority foreign 
owners are able to significantly affect the performance of institutions that are 
majority controlled by the government or local private investors. 
  Third, relatively little background information on the Chinese banking 
industry is widely known. Much less information is disseminated in the research 
literature about institutional history and regulation of the Chinese banking system 
than is available about banks in other developing nations in Asia, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe. Knowledge of how the economic environment in China 
differs from these nations and the effects of prior reforms in China may provide 
insight on the likely effects of future reforms. 
  The main goals of this paper are to help fill these gaps in the research 
literature. First, we analyze the profit and cost efficiency of banks operating in 
China using 266 annual observations over 1994–2003, covering 95% of total 
banking assets. We compare the efficiency of the Big Four banks, Non-Big Four 
state-owned banks, private domestic banks, and foreign banks. The data are from 
a number of sources, including Bankscope and Almanac of China’s Finance and 
Banking. Second, we examine the efficiency effects of minority foreign 
ownership of Chinese banks. Some of the Non-Big Four state-owned banks and 
some of the private domestic banks have minority foreign ownership. It seems 
reasonable to assume that if minority foreign ownership has strong effects on the 
                                                 
1 See Stulz (2005) and Kho et al (2006) for discussion on how agency problems of domestic firms 
allow insiders to own large equity stakes of firms in developing nations, which limits the role of 
foreign investors or institutions.  
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efficiency of both of these types of institutions, then it is likely to have 
qualitatively similar effects on the Big Four banks. Finally, we provide 
comprehensive background information on the history, regulation, and market 
environment for the Chinese banking industry that has undergone substantial 
regulatory reforms in recent decades. 
  Our results suggest strong favorable efficiency effects from reforms that 
reduce the state ownership of banks in China and increase the role of foreign 
ownership. In terms of majority ownership, foreign banks are the most profit 
efficient, followed by private domestic banks. State-owned institutions – 
particularly the Big Four – are least efficient. These results are consistent with 
research on other developing nations. The findings for banks with majority 
foreign ownership must be viewed with caution as we are able to include only a 
small number of these banks with permission to take deposits/make loans in the 
local currency. 
  The cost efficiency findings present the anomaly that state-owned institutions 
have relatively high measured cost efficiency. This may be due in part to 
‘skimping’ on underwriting and monitoring loans. This behavior may save costs 
with reduced expenditures on lending due diligence in the short-term, but it yields 
high nonperforming loans and poor loan revenues. Further investigation is 
consistent with ‘skimping’, as state-owned banks have much higher rates of 
nonperforming loans and lower loan revenues than other institutions. Profit 
efficiency includes loan revenues and so nets out some of these effects. 
  Our main empirical focus is on the effects of minority foreign ownership. The 
results suggest that such ownership increases the efficiency of both state-owned 
banks and private domestic banks with such ownership. This finding holds for 
both profit and cost efficiencies. We also conduct a check of the data that suggests 
that our findings of beneficial effects of minority foreign ownership generally 
reflect improvements in performance after the foreign investment, rather than just 
a selection effect in which foreigners purchase shares in relatively efficient banks. 
Nonetheless, we cannot completely rule out a more complex selection effect under 
which foreigners invest in banks that were likely to have future efficiency 
improvements in any event. This could occur because Chinese owners tend to 
allow minority foreign ownership for banks that are going to improve and/or 
because the foreigners are strategic in their choice of targets. 
  Section 2 reviews some of the research literature on bank ownership type and 
efficiency in developing nations generally and in China in particular. Section 3 
gives background information on the Chinese banking industry. Section 4 shows 
our data on the Chinese banks and outlines our empirical methodology. Section 5 
displays our empirical results, and Section 6 investigates the mechanisms through 




2  Literature on bank ownership type and 
efficiency 
Many studies examine the efficiency effects of bank ownership type – whether an 
institution is state-owned, private domestic, or foreign – with very significant 
differences found among these types. Here, we highlight some of the findings of 
this research, focusing on results for developing nations, which may give insights 
into the likely effects in China. We also briefly discuss the few studies on bank 
efficiency in China. 
 
 
2.1  Evidence on bank efficiency in developing nations 
The most common findings for developing nations are that on average, foreign 
banks are more efficient than or approximately equally efficient to private 
domestic banks. Both groups are typically found to be significantly more efficient 
on average than state-owned banks, but there are variations on all of these 
findings. To illustrate, some research using data from the transition nations of 
Eastern Europe finds foreign banks to be the most efficient on average, followed 
by private domestic banks, and then state-owned banks (Bonin et al, 2005a,b). 
However, another study of transition nations finds the mixed result that foreign 
banks are more cost efficient, but less profit efficient than both private domestic 
and state-owned banks (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). A study using 28 
developing nations from various regions finds foreign banks to have the highest 
profit efficiency, followed by private domestic banks, and then state-owned banks 
(Berger et al, 2004). For cost efficiency, the private domestic banks rank higher 
than the foreign banks, but both are still much more efficient than state-owned 
banks. Two studies using Argentine data (prior to the crisis in 2002) find roughly 
equal efficiency for foreign and private domestic banks, and that both are more 
efficient on average than state-owned banks (Delfino, 2003; Berger et al, 2005). A 
study of Pakistani data finds foreign banks are more profit efficient than private 
domestic banks and state-owned banks, but all of these groups have similar 
average cost efficiency (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005). Finally, a study of 
Indian banks finds that foreign banks are more efficient on average than private 




                                                 
2 This study also finds the unusual result that state-owned banks are relatively efficient, which may 
be due to accounting practices, cross-subsidies from other government agencies, or low-cost 
accounts by other state-owned firms.  
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2.2 Evidence  on  bank  efficiency in China 
There have been a few recent studies of Chinese bank efficiency and reform with 
mixed or contradictory results.
3 To our knowledge, none have used the 
comprehensive concept of profit efficiency nor have any addressed issues of 
foreign ownership. One study compares the cost efficiency of Big Four banks and 
two smaller size classes of majority state-owned joint-equity banks over the 
period 1993–2000, and finds that the Big Four and smaller joint-equity banks are 
both cost efficient relative to the medium-sized joint-equity banks (Chen et al, 
2005).
4 However, a recent working paper using an input distance function 
approach finds contrary results. Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) find that the Big 
Four are less efficient than the joint-equity banks over the period of 1993–2002, 
and consistent findings are reported by Fu and Heffernan (2006). 
  These studies also have contradictory implications regarding the effects of 
deregulation. Chen et al (2005) find that the financial deregulation of the mid-
1990s had strong positive efficiency effects; Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) find 
that deregulation did not result in significant efficiency improvement; and Fu and 
Heffernan (2006) find that cost efficiency of the banks was higher during the first 
phase of bank reforms.
5 
  Our empirical application is quite different. We use the more comprehensive 
concept of profit efficiency, which embodies revenues and loan performance, 
rather than just costs or inputs. More important, we study the effects of the 
current, potentially more significant reforms that allow for foreign bank 
ownership, particularly minority foreign ownership of Chinese banks. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Some of the bank research literature on China compares bank performance using ratio analysis 
(eg, Li et al, 2001). Ratio analyses do not control for individual bank outputs, input prices, or other 
exogenous factors facing banks in the way that studies using modern efficiency methodology does, 
and so may give misleading results. To illustrate, a cost-efficient bank may have relatively high 
cost ratios because it is producing a high-cost output bundle (eg, more loans, fewer liquid assets) 
or faces high input prices, and so may be incorrectly identified as a poor performer. Some studies 
also describe Chinese bank reform and its consequences (eg, Shiria, 2001). Examples include 
examinations of the determinants and timing of foreign bank entry into China and the time 
associated with earning profitable returns by foreign branches in Shanghai (eg, Leung, 1997; 
Leung et al, 2003a,b). The effects of the current reform in which the large state-owned banks are 
taking on minority foreign ownership has not been analyzed to our knowledge. 
4 ‘Joint-equity’ banks in China refer to domestically-owned commercial banks with a mixed 
structure of equity collected from the state, state-owned enterprises, and private enterprises or 
individuals. Some of these banks also issue public shares in the stock market. In the literature of 
Chinese banks, ‘joint-equity’ and ‘joint-stock’ are equivalent concepts. 
5 Other studies in Chinese also find contradictory results (Huang, 1998; Wei and Wang, 2000; Yao 
et al, 2004).  
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3  Background on the Chinese banking industry 
We review the institutional history, regulation, and economic environment of the 
Chinese banking system. This system has undergone – and continues to undergo – 
significant changes due to policy shifts prior to the 1990s, during the 1990s until 
WTO entry in 2001, and since WTO entry. 
 
 
3.1 Pre-1990s  banking  environment 
The Chinese socialist banking system was established in the late 1940s following 
the system in the former Soviet Union. The central bank, People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), was founded in 1948 through consolidation of the former Huabei Bank, 
the Beihai Bank and the Xibei Peasant Bank. PBOC was stripped of many of its 
central bank functions during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but later 
regained responsibility for currency issue and monetary control. Before 1978, the 
Chinese system followed a mono-bank model, where PBOC combined the roles of 
central and commercial banking. The banks – which were either taken 
over/restructured into the PBOC system or under administration by PBOC or the 
Ministry of Finance – were just part of the hierarchy to ensure that national 
production plans would be fulfilled, with no incentives to compete with one 
another. 
  Under reforms begun in 1978, the banking system expanded by establishing 
several large state-owned commercial banks, and splitting the Big Four state-
owned banks and the lending functions from the PBOC. The Bank of China 
(BOC, established 1912), China Construction Bank (CCB, 1954), Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC, 1979), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC, 1984) were initially limited to serve only their designated sector of the 
economy (ie, foreign trade and exchange; construction; agriculture; industrial and 
commercial lending). In 1985, the Big Four were allowed to compete in all 
sectors. Nonetheless, competition among them was very limited until the mid-
1990s, because they served mainly as policy-lending ‘conduits’ for the 




                                                 
6 Also in the mid-1980s, the nature of centrally planned financial resources allocation was revised, 
and the local governments could decide their own resource allocation via domestic loans and self-
raised funds, nurturing a revitalization process of banking (Li, 1994; Yi, 1994). Although policy 
lending blocked competition among state-owned banks, the entry of new banks created a new 
source of competition.  
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3.2  The 1990s until WTO entry in December 2001 
The asset quality of state-owned banks deteriorated significantly during the 1990s, 
as these banks made most of their loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
had little incentive to repay. To ameliorate this problem, the government 
established three policy banks in 1994 to take over the policy-lending activities 
from the state-owned banks and the Ministry of Finance issued 270 billion RMB 
or yuan (US $32.6 billion) of 30-year government special bonds to recapitalize the 
Big Four banks in 1998. In 1999, 1.4 trillion RMB of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) of the Big Four (roughly 20% of their total loans) were bought at face 
value by four state-owned asset management companies. 
  Although the asset quality of the Chinese banks has been a serious concern, 
there is no explicit deposit insurance. Instead, there is implicit deposit insurance in 
the sense that the Chinese government has almost always stepped in to either help 
the banks who were in financial difficulties to write-off their bad loans, or paid off 
the outstanding debts in case of bank failures.
7 However, things began to change 
in 1999, when Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation was 
closed due to inability to payout outstanding debt with amount exceeding US $5 
billion. The central government did not assume the main repayment 
responsibilities as creditors expected, and the debt-holders finally collected an 
average of 12.54% back from their original investment.
8 
  Two major legislative reforms occurred in 1995. The 1995 Central Bank Law 
of China confirmed PBOC as the central bank and substantially reduced the 
influence of local governments on credit allocation decisions. The 1995 
Commercial Bank Law of China officially termed the major state-owned banks as 
‘commercial banks’, and directed them more towards commercial business based 
on market principles instead of policy lending. New banks also entered the market 
in the mid-1990s.
9 
  The Chinese government has been very conservative in allowing foreign bank 
entry. Foreign banks were allowed to open representative offices in 1979, and 
                                                 
7 Examples are the Hainan Development Bank and some small credit cooperatives that went 
bankrupt and had to be closed, but the central government assumed the responsibilities of their 
outstanding debts. 
8 There are signs that the Chinese regulators moving toward formal deposit insurance. A ‘Deposit 
Insurance Office’ was established within the Financial Stability Bureau of PBOC in 2005. It is also 
reported that the China Banking Regulatory Commission is working on plans to introduce a 
system like the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
9 China Minsheng Banking Corporation was founded in 1996 and is almost solely owned by 
private institutional shareholders, making it the largest private bank in China. By the end of 1999, 
there were 12 national shareholding commercial banks, with total assets of 1,447.7 billion RMB 
(PBOC 2000). The central government also allowed local governments to establish local banks in 
the mid-1990s by consolidating local rural and urban cooperatives. They take the form of 
shareholding banks and are named as city cooperative banks, with their business restricted to their 
localities. By 1999, 90 such banks were operating in China, with total assets of 554.7 billion RMB 
(PBOC 2000).  
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have been allowed to open operational branches in Special Economic Zones since 
1982 (eg, Hong Kong banks operating in nearby Shenzhen). This geographical 
restriction was somewhat relaxed in 1994 – they were allowed to operate in 23 
cities based on individual applications. Foreign banks were first permitted to do 
business with Chinese enterprises by taking deposits and making loans in local 
currency (RMB) in the Shanghai Pudong New Zone in 1996 (and later in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone) on the basis of individual licenses. In 1998, 
PBOC permitted eight foreign licensee banks to obtain local currency funding in 
1998. In 1999, foreign banks were further allowed to conduct local currency 
business in neighboring regions. By the end of 1999, 25 foreign banks had 
permission to conduct local currency business with Chinese enterprises, with 
totals of 21,813 million RMB (about US $2,635 million) in assets, 11,341 million 
RMB (about US $1,340 million) in loans, and 15,100 million RMB (about US 
$1,824 million) in deposits. Total assets of all foreign banks in China reached 
nearly 272 billion RMB (US $32,844 million) by 1999. Foreign banks were 
prohibited from conducting any consumer banking in local currency (RMB) with 
mainland residents during the 1990s. 
  Regulatory permission for foreign investors to hold minority stakes in 
domestic banks was forthcoming more slowly. The first case was in 1996, when 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) bought a 1.9% stake in China Everbright Bank 
(a national shareholding commercial bank, majority state-owned).
10 This was 
followed by the purchase of 5% stake in Bank of Shanghai (a municipal 
commercial bank, 30% stake held by Shanghai municipal government) by 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1998, the purchase of a 15% stake of 
Nanjing City Commercial Bank (a majority state-owned city commercial bank) by 
ADB in 2001, and acquisition of an 8% stake in Bank of Shanghai by HSBC 
Holdings PLC at the end of 2001. Total equity investment by foreigners in the 
domestic banks through 2001 was minimal due to stringent license granting 
policies and regulations, and most of the investors were non-profit international 
organizations.
11 
  Turning our attention to the issue of bank taxes, historically, every enterprise 
had to negotiate a contract every year with the government on their tax burden 
                                                 
10 A 21.39% stake of CEB has been held by China Everbright Limited (CEL) which was listed in 
HK stock exchange from 1973, and CEL’s controlling shareholder is China Everbright Group 
(CEG) who holds 55.8% of CEL’s total shares, acquired in 1994. CEG is a state-owned financial 
group under direct administration of the State Council. 
11 Other reforms in the 1990s include: 1) the 1995 Commercial Banking Law strictly prohibits 
commercial bank involvement in nontraditional banking activities like insurance and securities 
(similar to Glass-Steagall); 2) in 1998, PBOC further reduced local government influence on bank 
lending activities by replacing its 30 provincial branches with 9 cross-province regional branches; 
3) increased flexibility for commercial banks to adjust interest rates; and 4) PBOC made 
recommendations to improve bank risk controls, specifically to follow the Basel requirements in 
classifying the loans into different risk-adjusted categories in order to meet the comprehensive 
banking supervision requirement outlined in ‘Basel Core Principles for effective supervision.’  
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(the ‘contractual approach’), rather than following any explicit uniform tax laws 
or regulations (Xu and Zhang, 1995). The first reform came in 1994 and a further 
change was enacted in 1997 under which all domestic commercial banks were 
subject to a uniform 33% tax rate. Foreign banks have been subject to a relatively 
lower tax burden, due to the different tax-exempt incentives available to all 
foreign companies, especially since 1991. 
 
 
3.3  The environment after WTO entry in December 2001 
Since China gained entry into the WTO, a new set of rules began to take effect, 
and some existing regulations and laws, such as the 1995 Central Bank Law and 
Commercial Bank Law, were revised to be aligned with the WTO agreement. 
According to the promised agenda, there will be more liberalization of interest 
rates, more fair treatment of tax rates among players, less restrictions on 
ownership takeovers and M&As, and greater freedom of operational and 
geographical scope in the Chinese banking industry. For example, starting in 
2002, foreign banks could provide foreign currency services for Chinese residents 
and enterprises, and starting in February 2004, China opened its local currency 
market and allowed foreign banks to provide local currency services to Chinese 
enterprises in designated cities and areas, while the retail market is supposed to be 
opened for foreign banks in December 2006, under the pledge of the WTO 
agreement. However, in late 2006, the Chinese regulators imposed new 
requirements to meet before the foreign banks are allowed to take deposits in 
RMB from Chinese individuals, which led to further delays of foreign banks’ 
access to consumers.
12 A recent move on this issue occurred in April 2007, four 
foreign banks (Citigroup Inc., HSBC Holdings PLC, Standard Chartered PLC, and 
Bank of East Asia Ltd.), after obtaining approval from Chinese regulators, began 
to accept deposits in RMB from the country’s citizens. 
  One attempt of the government to achieve better monitoring of the banking 
industry was the creation of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 
2003 to oversee reforms and regulations. Also in 2003, the State Council initiated 
the ‘pilot state-owned bank-overhaul program’, granting US $45 billion to BOC 
and CCB to increase capital, instead of writing off bad loans. New systems of 
external and internal monitoring of asset quality were also implemented. In 2003, 
CBRC updated guidelines to encourage foreign share purchases – foreigners can 
                                                 
12 Among other things, the new rules require that foreign banks incorporate their operations 
locally, ie, establish a stand-alone holding company, incorporated in China with its own board of 
directors.  
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own up to 25% of any domestic bank, with the ownership from any one investor 
allowed between 5% and 20%, subject to regulatory approval.
13 
  Examples of strategic foreign investments during the post-WTO period 
include Citigroup’s purchase of about 5% of Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
(a Shanghai-based commercial bank, about 40% state-owned) in January 2003, 
and a consortium (including Hang Seng Bank Ltd., IFC, etc.)’s purchase of 
24.98% stake in Industrial Bank (a southern Fujian Province-based bank, 34% 
held by Fujian Provincial Bureau of Finance) in December 2003. In 2004, 
Newbridge Capital Ltd. (a US investor group) bought about 18% of Shenzhen 
Development Bank Co. (a national Shenzhen-based listed bank), the first time that 
foreign investors became the largest and controlling shareholder of a national 
domestic bank. In August 2004, Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. (a unit of 
HSBC Holding PLC) also finalized its transaction to purchase a 19.9% stake of 
Bank of Communications (the fifth-largest bank in China, 23.76% owned by 
Ministry of Finance of China) US $1.75 billion, and it secured the right to double 
this share when regulations allow.
14 More recently, Deutsche Bank AG-led group 
has agreed to buy 14% stake of Hua Xia Bank, another big national majority state-
owned commercial bank. On Dec 31, 2005, the first Chinese bank born with 
foreign minority stake (from the Standard Chartered, which bought 19.99% of the 
shares), China Bohai Bank, was established, and it is also the only national 
shareholding commercial bank that established after 1997. By October 2006, nine 
city commercial banks had also reached agreement with foreign investors.
15 
  The partial privatization has now spread to three of the Big Four banks, as 
they reached agreements to take on minority foreign ownership. On June 17, 
                                                 
13 In 2004, the CBRC required that foreign investors are qualified only if they meet four principles: 
‘long-term equity-holdings, optimizing corporate governance, business cooperation, competition-
avoidance’. In 2005, these four principles were amplified to a more detailed specification by 
CBRC, ie, no less than 3 years of equity holding, board member appointment, technology and 
network support, and investing in no more than two Chinese banks with similar business, etc. 
(Zhuo 2005). CBRC also requires that in order to become a ‘qualified’ foreign strategic investor in 
a new shareholding commercial bank, the foreign investors must have: (1) minimum assets of $10 
billion; good standing on its long-term credit rating by international credit rating agencies; positive 
profits on the last two accounting calendar years; and is committed to the 2004 principles; and 
conforming to the 20% and 25% limits for single and multiple foreign investors in Chinese banks. 
14 However, after the investment, the Ministry of Finance increased its shares so that it remains the 
largest shareholder, potentially a sign that that the Chinese government remains cautious about 
foreign investment in domestic banks. 
15 These nine city commercial banks are: Bank of Shanghai, Nanjing City Commercial Bank, Bank 
of Beijing, Xi’an City Commercial Bank, Jinan City Commercial Bank, Wenzhou City 
Commercial Bank, and Nanyun City Commercial Bank, Hangzhou City Commercial Bank, and 
Ningbo City Commercial Bank.  
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2005, Bank of America reached a deal to buy a 9% stake in CCB.
16 Also in June 
2005, CCB signed a deal with Temasek in which the Singapore investment firm 
would pay US $1.5 billion for a 5.1% stake and then invest a further US $1 billion 
in shares when the bank goes public. In September 2005, Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Temasek each agreed to buy 10% stakes in BOC.
17 In both the CCB and BOC 
cases, the foreign strategic investors have also been required to lock up their 
shares for three years. In January 2006, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Allianz AG, 
and American Express Co. signed an agreement to buy a total 10% stake of ICBC 
for $3.78 billion, and Goldman Sachs has been providing staff training, risk-
management assistance and guidance on internal control and corporate 
governance. 
  Another strategy of the regulators in order to improve Chinese banks’ 
management is to encourage the banks to list on stock exchanges for additional 
external monitoring. The Bank of Communications was the first to take this route 
in June 2005 when it raised more than US $2 billion in an IPO in Hong Kong. 
Three of the Big Four banks have since issued IPOs outside mainland China. 
First, CCB issued IPOs in October 2005 and raised HK $62.25 billion (about US 
$8 billion) in Hong Kong. Next, BOC raised HK $860 billion (about US $11.2 
billion) in Hong Kong in June 2006 and followed this with a listing of A-shares in 
Shanghai which raised 20 billion RMB (about US $2.5 billion). Finally, ICBC 
issued its IPOs at both Shanghai and Hong Kong in October 2006 and raised 
about US $21.9 billion, including HK $124.7 (about US $16.0 billion) raised in 
Hong Kong, and about 46.64 billion RMB (about US $5.9 billion) raised in 
Shanghai, making it the world’s biggest IPO so far. Notably, the public shares 
issued in Hong Kong or any other location outside mainland China are not subject 
to the 25% restriction on foreign ownership. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Bank of America also has a nonexclusive, 5 1/2-year option to increase its stake to 19.9% at the 
price of shares in the IPO. In addition, Bank of America has a seven-year strategic alliance with 
CCB that involves committing the equivalent of 50 Bank of America employees’ time to work at 
the Chinese bank. Also, Bank of America has one seat on a 15-person board, and the two sides 
have agreed to discuss a potential credit-card joint venture in China. As part of this, Bank of 
America agreed to withdraw from retail banking in China, though it retains its corporate and 
commercial-banking presence. 
17 Temasek later cut its stake to 5%, following a backlash against the sale of shares in large state 
banks to foreigners.  
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4  Data and methodology 
4.1 Sample  and  definition  of majority ownership 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel which includes financials and ownership data 
of 38 Chinese banks during the period of 1994 to 2003, totaling 266 observations. 
The basic data source is Bankscope – Fitch’s International Bank Database. 
Whenever Bankscope does not provide enough information or has questionable 
values, we collect or double-check the data from other official sources, such as 
annual issues of Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1994–2004; annual 
Issues of China Statistical Yearbook, 1994–2004. We also use annual reports 
provided by individual banks via their websites, and newspaper releases on the 
performance and financial information of the banks in tracing missing or 
unavailable data points. Most of the sample banks follow Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS) while a few also prepared annual reports based on International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). The banks following IAS standards are primarily the 
joint venture banks, foreign banks, and banks listed in the stock market. While 
there are some differences between the CAS and IAS however, it should be 
mentioned that the CAS was developed only in recent years following the 
principles of IAS. While we recognize that there may be some inconsistencies in 
financial data using different accounting standards, we do not find a material 
difference between the financial statements of the same bank while reporting 
under both CAS and IAS respectively. Among the 38 Chinese banks, we have full 
information on the Big Four state-owned banks, which have more than 72% of the 
total market share in Chinese banking industry in 2003. Among the 11 national 
shareholding commercial banks – known as the ‘second-tier’ domestic banks 
which own almost 19% of banking assets – our sample include 10 banks. These 
10 banks own 99% of the total assets of the second-tier banks. We also have 16 of 
the 113 city commercial banks in China who possess almost half the assets of 
these city banks. Most of these city banks are established after 1998 and are very 
small and do not provide any information of their financial activities or ownership 
details. We also have 6 joint venture banks (foreign ownership of at least 25%, but 
less than 100%) and 2 solely foreign banks. The city commercials, along with the 
joint venture banks and solely foreign banks, make up the ‘third-tier’ banks in the 
industry, and they took up less than 10% of the total markets in 2005. Our sample 
covers over 95% of the banking assets in China. 
  We define majority state-owned banks as those banks whose state and state-
owned enterprises ownership is greater than 50% of total ownership; majority 
private domestic banks are defined as those banks whose private domestic 
ownership is greater than 50% of total ownership; majority foreign banks are 
defined as those banks whose foreign ownership is greater than 50% of total  
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ownership, and no majority ownership banks are those without any majority 
ownership. Bank size is defined based on total assets (prices are inflation-adjusted 
to the base year 1994) of the bank at year t, and the bank is a small bank if its 
assets are less than or equal to US $ 1 billion, medium bank if the bank’s assets 
are greater than US $1 billion but less than or equal to US $20 billion; large bank 
if the bank’s assets are greater than US $20 billion. 
 
 
4.2  Computation of efficiency levels and efficiency ranks 
Cost and profit efficiency measure how well a bank is predicted to perform 
relative to a ‘best-practice’ bank producing the same outputs under the same 
environmental conditions. That is, efficiency measures how close to the minimum 
cost or maximum profit a bank is, where the minimum and maximum are 
determined by best performers in the sample. We estimate efficiency levels by 
specifying the commonly-used translog functional form for the cost and profit 



































































































where i, t index the bank and year, respectively, k = 1,…4 index the four output 
variables, and δjk ≡ δkj. C represents the bank’s total costs. There are four outputs 
(y); total loans, total deposits, liquid assets, other earning assets; two input prices 
(w): interest expenses to total deposits, noninterest expenses to fixed assets; and 
one fixed input (z): total earning assets. The ln  u term represents a bank’s 
efficiency level and ln v is a random error that incorporates both measurement 
error and luck. The cost function is estimated using the (ln  u  +  ln  v) as a 
composite error term. The normalization by bank’s total earning assets (z1) 
reduces heteroskedasticity, and allows banks of any size to have comparable 
residual terms from which the efficiencies are calculated. The normalization by 
the last input price (w2) ensures price homogeneity. 
  A bank’s cost efficiency level is determined by comparing its actual costs to 
best-practice minimum costs to produce the same output under the same 
conditions using estimates of the efficiency factor ln  u, which is disentangled  
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from the estimated cost function residual using some distributional assumptions.
18 
We also use the efficiency rank based on an ordering of the banks’ cost efficiency 
levels in each year. The ranks are then converted to a uniform scale over [0,1] 
using the formula (orderit − 1)/(nt −  1), where orderit is the place in ascending 
order of the ith bank in the tth year in terms of its cost efficiency level and nt is the 
number of banks in year t. Thus, the bank i’s efficiency rank in year t gives the 
proportion of the other sample banks in that year with lower efficiency level (eg, a 
bank in year t with efficiency level better than 70% of other banks in the country 
has a rank of 0.70). The bank with the lowest cost efficiency level has the worst 
rank of 0[(1 − 1)/(nt − 1)], and the bank with the highest cost efficiency level has 
the best rank of 1[(nt − 1)/(nt − 1)]. 
  Profit efficiency levels and ranks are estimated similarly. Total profits replace 
total costs and we add a constant before taking the log to avoid taking a log of 
negative number. For the ranks, we arrange the residuals in ascending order, so 
that the bank with the highest profit function residual has the best rank of 1.
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  Efficiency levels are more accurate than ranks because the levels account for 
the measured distance from the best-practice frontier. However, efficiency ranks 
have the benefit of being more comparable across time. The ranks for every time 
period follow the same uniform [0,1] distribution, whereas the distributions of 
efficiency levels may differ with the economic environment over time. Neither the 
levels nor the ranks are clearly superior ex ante. We show both concepts below 
and the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
 
5 Empirical  results 
5.1  Tests of main hypothesis 
We test the differences in average profit and cost efficiency for the four main 
categories of majority bank ownership – Big Four, non-Big Four majority state-
owned, majority private domestic, and majority foreign over the sample period. 
We also test for differences in average efficiency of some subcategories – 
specifically the non-Big Four majority state-owned banks with minority foreign 
ownership, and the majority private domestic banks with minority foreign-
ownership. Together, these findings may help address whether the Big Four banks 
                                                 
18 For a general description and examples of bank efficiency estimation, see Berger and Mester 
(1997). 
19 The use of output quantities, rather than output prices is necessitated by the lack of accurate data 
on output prices. Other arguments also favor the use of this alternative profit function (see Berger 
and Mester, 1997).  
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have a problem of low efficiency and whether minority foreign ownership of these 
institutions might help correct such a problem. 
  We consider profit efficiency to superior to cost efficiency as an indicator of 
the quality of bank management. This is because profit efficiency is the more 
inclusive concept – taking account of both cost and revenue performance – given 
that managers have some control over both revenues and costs. Any qualitative 
differences in the findings between profit and cost efficiency are due to 
differences in revenue performance. 
  As mentioned earlier, we measure efficiency levels and ranks from pooled 
observations incorporating year dummies. In doing so, we avoid any estimation 
biases that may arise due to potential changes in bank performance due to 
technological progress or changes in the economic and regulatory environments. 
We avoid time fixed effects again in the secondary regressions given the 
efficiency scores are adjusted for sample years, avoiding time adjustment twice. 
Importantly, if we add year dummy variables in the secondary regressions, we end 
up imposing different constant for each year. This is a disadvantage for capture 
the effects when banks convert to another types of ownership in the later years, 
particularly taking on minority foreign ownership. Nonetheless, we try including 
these time fixed effects and the results are qualitatively similar. Our regressions 
for the effects of ownership type also take account of the changes over time due to 
technological progress and changes in the economic environment by using 
efficiency ranks that impose the same distribution on the efficiencies each year. 
  Before proceeding, an important caveat is in order regarding analyzing the 
efficiency of state-owned banks. These institutions have historically faced 
pressures and directions from central and local governments to grant policy loans 
for political purposes, rather than for profit maximization. This is consistent with 
findings for state-owned banks in other nations (eg, Sapienza, 2004). One recent 
paper argues that despite the recent reforms, the pressure on the state-owned 
banks to make negative net present value policy loans remains present, and will 
become apparent in a future economic slowdown (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). 
  Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the profit and cost efficiency levels 
and ranks for the different ownership categories. The overall efficiencies shown at 
the bottom of the table are in line with efficiency literature. The mean profit 
efficiency level of 0.476 suggests that on average, banks earn about half of the 
profits that the best-practice bank in the sample would make under the same 
conditions. Similarly, the mean cost efficiency level of 0.897 suggests that the 
typical bank wastes about 10% of its costs relative to the best-practice bank. The 
means for the efficiency ranks are both 0.50 by construction. As discussed above, 
the levels are more accurate, but the ranks are more comparable over time – so 
neither concept is strictly preferred ex ante. The profit efficiencies in Table 3 
clearly suggest that with regard to majority ownership, foreign banks are the most 
efficient, with mean level and rank of 0.692 and 0.797, respectively, followed by  
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private domestic banks (0.589, 0.642), non-Big Four majority state-owned 
institutions (0.480, 0.495), with the Big Four being measured as least profit 
efficient by far (0.234, 0.222). The banks with no majority ownership (mix of 
state, private domestic and foreign ownership with no share above 50%) have no 
clear ownership control, and so are just included as a control group in the 
regressions, but their efficiencies are not analyzed. 
  The subcategories of ownership show even more dramatic and interesting 
differences, suggesting that minority foreign ownership may be quite important. 
Non-Big Four state-owned banks with minority foreign ownership have much 
higher profit efficiency and rank than those with no foreign minority, and the 
same effect occurs for majority private domestic banks. For example, for non-Big 
Four banks, minority foreign ownership is associated with almost a 20 percentage 
point higher profit efficiency level (61.7% versus 42.1%) and almost a 30 
percentage higher profit efficiency rank (69.4% versus 41.0%). Thus, the profit 
efficiency means are consistent with the hypothesis that the Big Four banks are 
quite inefficient, and that minority foreign ownership may be expected to make 
these institutions more efficient, although formal tests of these hypotheses await 
the regression analysis below. 
  The cost efficiencies in Table 3 suggest that non-Big Four state-owned banks 
and majority foreign are the most efficient, with the majority private measured as 
the least efficient. The Big Four are only about 2 percentage points below the 
most cost-efficient categories, and not much below the median cost efficiency 
with an average rank of 0.454. Importantly, however, both subcategories with 
minority foreign ownership still have higher average measured cost efficiency 
than the corresponding subcategories with no minority foreign ownership. 
  A few words are appropriate regarding some of the seeming inconsistency 
between the findings for cost efficiency and profit efficiency of state-owned 
banks, particularly the Big Four, which are measured as very profit inefficient and 
only slightly more cost inefficient on average. It is not likely that these institutions 
are reasonably adept at managing their costs but extremely incompetent in 
managing their revenues. A much more likely explanation is the ‘skimping 
hypothesis’ in which these banks allocate few resources on underwriting and 
monitoring loans, which saves costs in the short term, but yields poor loan 
revenues in the long run (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). That is, these banks may 
spend little on screening and investigating potential borrowers prior to granting 
credit and/or monitoring borrowers after loans are issued. As a result, many of the 
loans do not perform and loan revenues are very low – which may more than 
offset the cost savings from ‘skimping’. Further investigation is consistent with 
this explanation – state-owned banks – particularly the Big Four – have much 
higher rates of nonperforming loans than other institutions.
20 
                                                 
20 We are not aware of any other evidence on the ‘skimping hypothesis’ in developing nations.  
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  It is also possible that the measured cost efficiency for these institutions may 
reflect in part government subsidies on the cost side. For example, state-owned 
banks may not pay full market rent for offices, may pay below-market rates on 
deposits from government-owned nonfinancial firms, or may have subsidized 
equity capital and other protections from the government.
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  It is beyond the scope of this paper to distinguish empirically how much of 
the measured cost efficiency may reflect ‘skimping’, cost subsidies, or other 
causes. Nonetheless, we generally favor the profit efficiency results because profit 
efficiency is the more inclusive concept and the revenue differences between 
state-owned and other banks appear to be more important than cost differences. 
  Tables 4 and 5 present regressions with the formal tests of all of these 
efficiency differences. The first four columns in Table 4 show regressions of 
profit efficiency levels on the ownership types. The last four columns use profit 
efficiency ranks. The regressions vary according to whether bank size class 
dummies are included and whether the subcategories of the minority foreign 
ownership are specified. Table 5 presents the corresponding findings for cost 
efficiency. In all cases, the omitted dummy variable is Majority private domestic, 
so all of the efficiencies are measured relative to this category. The t-statistics are 
based on standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
  The results in Table 4 are consistent with the findings for the raw data on 
efficiency means discussed in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2) for both profit 
efficiency levels and ranks, the Big Four are the least profit efficient by far, with 
the non-Big Four state-owned banks being second-to-least efficient. In columns 
(3) and (4), minority foreign ownership is included. In all cases, these indicators 
are positive and statistically significant, consistent with the hypothesis that the 
addition of minority foreign owners to either majority state-owned banks or 
majority private domestic banks increases efficiency. 
  The cost efficiency results in Table 5 are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that minority foreign ownership increases bank efficiency in all cases. The 
majority ownership results again show the anomaly that state-owned banks are 
measured as more cost efficient than private domestic banks, consistent with 
‘skimping’ behavior. In all cases, regression results are consistent with the 
findings for the raw data on efficiency means discussed in Table 3 and support the 
hypothesis that the Big Four banks are very profit inefficient, and that minority 
foreign ownership may be expected to improve their efficiency. 
  Given the importance and urgency of reducing nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
within the banking system, we conduct a robustness test on the ‘asset quality’ 
                                                 
21 We argue that the quality of the financial statements of our sample banks is not likely the 
primary force that drives the results, based on the fact that the accounting standards that these 
banks follow are not significantly different. Even in cases where IAS (International Accounting 
Standards) is adopted rather than CAS (Chinese Accounting Standards), the signature of a co-
auditing Chinese Certified Public Accountant is required.  
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(1 −  NPL ratio) separately as another measure for efficiency. The results are 
reported in Table 6. Due to missing values of NPL, the size of the sample is 
reduced to 118 observations. Nonetheless, we find that minority foreign 
ownership is associated with significantly higher asset quality in both majority 
private domestic banks and majority state-owned banks. These results extend and 
complement our main efficiency results. 
 
 
5.2  Tests of an alternative hypothesis (selection effects) 
We recognize the possibility that our main empirical result – that minority foreign 
ownership is associated with higher efficiency – could reflect selection effects, 
rather than efficiency benefits. For instance, foreign owners could have selected 
relatively efficient institutions in which to invest and the efficiency of these banks 
did not improve as a consequence of their ownership. 
  To investigate this possibility, we compute the average efficiency change 
from the 4 years prior to the foreign investment to as many as the 4 years after 
taking on minority foreign ownership (although there are usually fewer than 4 ex 
post years in the data set). We compare this with the change in average efficiency 
for the exact same years for the peer group of banks with no foreign ownership. 
That is, we examine the change in average efficiency between periods T − 4 ≤ 
tbefore  <  T and periods T  ≤ tafter ≤ T + 4  for  banks  that  take on minority foreign 
ownership in period T. We do this comparison separately for majority private 
domestic banks and non-Big Four majority state-owned banks. Thus, we see if the 
foreign investment is associated with an improvement in efficiency beyond what 
occurred for the appropriate peer group for the same time period to ensure that the 
finding in our main regressions does not simply reflect selection effects. 
  The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 7. Panel 1 focuses on the 
three majority private domestic banks that took on minority foreign ownership 
during the sample period and their peer group comparison. Panel 2 shows the 
corresponding information for the two majority state-owned banks with 
ownership change and peer comparison. The table explicitly excludes from all 
comparisons the Big Four banks, majority foreign-owned banks, no majority 
banks, and banks with minority foreign ownership that took on this ownership 
prior to the start of the sample period in 1994. We also exclude observations more 
than 4 years removed in either direction from the ownership change to reduce the 
influence of extraneous events further away in time. Thus, Table 7 has many 
fewer observations than are shown in Tables 3–5 in order to focus on the cleanest 
possible comparisons to address the question of whether our main finding reflects 
only selection effects rather than efficiency benefits.  
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  The findings suggest that minority foreign ownership is associated with 
efficiency improvements above and beyond any selection effects, although we do 
not rule out selection effects. As shown in Panel 1 of Table 7, for all four ways in 
which we measure efficiency − profit levels and ranks and cost levels and ranks − 
the change in efficiency from periods T − 4 ≤ tbefore < T to periods T ≤ tafter ≤ + 4 is 
statistically significantly greater for private domestic banks that take on minority 
foreign ownership than their peer group that remains entirely domestically-owned 
over the same time interval. For example, the profit efficiency level for private 
domestic banks that add minority foreign ownership rises from 0.589 to 0.740, 
which rounds to an average of 0.150 or 15.0 percentage points higher after 
investment than it was for these same institutions prior to the investment, 
(Difference A). The peer group average efficiency actually decreased over this 
same time interval by 12.7 percentage points from 0.554 to 0.428 (Difference B). 
As shown in the bottom row of Panel 1, the difference between these two 
differences of 0.277 or 27.7 percentage points is statistically significant, as well as 
large in magnitude (Difference C). The other three differences in the bottom row 
are also large, positive, and statistically significant, supporting the beneficial 
average effects of the foreign investments. Interestingly, although we focus on the 
changes in efficiency after investment as the correct tests for value enhancement 
associated with minority foreign ownership, we do observe that the private 
domestic banks selected for foreign investment had a higher efficiency ex ante 
than their peers. 
  The findings for state-owned banks other than the Big Four in Panel 2 are 
qualitatively similar. For all four ways we measure efficiency, the change in 
efficiency is statistically significantly greater for the state-owned institutions that 
take on minority foreign ownership than their peer group. Although the 
differences relative to peer groups shown in Table 7 are small relative to the 
minority foreign ownership effects shown in the regressions above, these are 
stringent tests using subsets of the data chosen for only the cleanest comparisons. 
While we do not rule out selection effects, the data do show improvements 
associated with adding minority foreign ownership. 
 
 
5.3  Additional robustness tests 
We also run an additional set of robustness checks of the effects of minority 
foreign ownership that are not shown for reasons of brevity. Specifically, we run 
efficiency regressions with fixed effects for every private domestic bank and 
every non-Big Four domestic bank and include dummies for minority foreign 
ownership of these institutions to capture the average effect of minority foreign 
ownership, controlling for the characteristics of the bank that remain constant. For  
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these fixed-effects regressions, we exclude observations on the Big Four, majority 
foreign, and no majority banks, and drop their indicator variables.
22 The results 
again suggest positive efficiency effects for minority foreign ownership – all of 
the dummies for minority foreign ownership are positive and significant. 
  We run a number of additional robustness tests of our main findings in which 
we specify alternative dependent variables and alter the data sample and 
specification. First, we rerun the efficiency analysis and comparisons exclusive of 
the Big Four banks. These four banks are so large relative to the other banks that 
they may be characterized by substantially different production technologies and 
thus different profit and cost functions. The results are consistent with the 
reported results for the combined sample – we continue to find minority foreign 
ownership to be associated with relatively high efficiency and improving 
efficiency after taking on minority foreign ownership. We also re-estimate all the 
profit models using pre-tax bank profits in order to be sure that the results are not 
driven by the differential tax rates among different groups of banks.
23 We still find 
our main results hold – the Big Four banks are still the least profit efficient banks, 
and minority foreign ownership improves the efficiency of both majority domestic 
and majority private banks. Further, we re-estimate all profit and cost efficiencies 
based on disaggregating noninterest expenses into separate prices for labor and 
physical capital by using exogenous labor cost in the market and find our results 
are not significantly changed.
24 These robustness checks are available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
 
                                                 
22 We cannot include fixed effects and indicators for these groups because the fixed effects would 
be perfectly correlated with the indicators, as their ownership does not change over time. 
23 Chinese banks are subject to different tax rate and taxation regulations. For example, the Big 
Four banks had been subject to 55% income tax rate before the regulators decided to reduce their 
tax burden in January 1997 to 33% level, while the 33% income tax rate has been enjoyed by other 
domestic commercial banks since 1994. For the foreign banks in China, it is reported that their 
average income tax rates are below 20% due to favorable tax-exempt policies in their early 
business years (Wang 2003). Nonetheless, while there are important differences in tax rates based 
on majority ownership, to our knowledge, there are no tax differences based on minority foreign 
ownership, the main focus of our investigation. 
24 A bank’s price of labor is defined as the weighted average of annual wages per employee, and it 
is constructed based on two factors, (i) concurrent market price of bank employees in each region, 
and (ii) the bank’s geographical allocation of its employees across regions. The price of physical 
capital is constructed as (noninterest expenses – personnel expenses)/fixed assets, where personnel 
expenses are the number of employees times the imputed wage rate.  
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6  Mechanisms through which minority foreign 
ownership may increase efficiency 
Before concluding, we briefly investigate the mechanisms through which minority 
foreign ownership may increase Chinese bank efficiency. To the extent that we 
can identify one or more such credible mechanisms and provide evidence 
consistent with them, the case for minority foreign ownership being the driving 
force behind the performance improvements may be considerably strengthened. 
However, if we cannot identify credible mechanisms and/or cannot find 
supporting evidence, it may be difficult to argue that minority foreign ownership 
is the key exogenous factor resulting in observed efficiency gains. 
  One mechanism that may be employed by minority foreign owners is to take 
positions on the board and in the management of Chinese banks and ‘leverage’ 
these positions to improve the corporate culture and management of these banks. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign owners often obtain one or two board 
seats on Chinese banks (out of a total of 6 or more), and that corporate governance 
and risk management improves significantly thereafter. The foreign board 
members/owners also appear to have convinced senior managers to be more 
aware of shareholders’ interests and to use more modern management techniques. 
In at least one instance, foreigners have taken over the senior positions on the 
board and in management. In some cases, the Chinese banks with minority foreign 
ownership are also able to send employees to the foreign bank’s headquarters for 
advanced training. See Ling and Lu (2004), Wall Street Journal (2004), Lin 
(2005), and Liu (2005) for specific examples of this mechanism at work in various 
Chinese banks. 
  The finding that foreign owners have superior skills that may be transferred to 
Chinese banks is consistent with the research literature on other nations – as well 
as with the empirical results here of relatively high efficiency for majority foreign 
banks. The Chinese government also believes that strategic foreign investors can 
bring substantial improvements for the Chinese banks with respect to their 
corporate governance, technological advancement, and risk management, and 
encourages these transfers of techniques from minority foreign owners. For 
example, authorities recently examined the changes in Chinese banks that 
introduced foreign investors. They report finding that strategic foreign investors 
are playing active, positive roles in improving the Chinese banks’ corporate 
governance, cost control, operation technologies, and growth sustainability 
(CBRC, 2005). Consistent with these benefits, several of the banks with partial 
foreign ownership have had recent upgrades of their credit ratings by international 
credit rating agencies (Li, 2005). 
  Research on other nations reinforces this favorable role of large minority 
shareholders. Studies of corporate governance of nonfinancial corporations in  
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developed nations suggests that large, minority shareholders such as institutional 
investors and individual block shareholders may improve monitoring of managers 
and mitigate free-rider problems (eg, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Tests of these governance 
effects on US bank efficiency find positive effects of institutional holdings in 
some cases (eg, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Finally, a study of partial 
privatization in India is consistent with favorable effects of minority private 
ownership of state-owned nonfinancial companies. The findings suggest that 
allowing non-controlling shares of state-owned enterprises to be privately held has 
positive effects on profitability, productivity, and investment (Gupta, 2005). 
  A second method through which strategic minority foreign owners may 
increase Chinese bank efficiency is by mandating or encouraging the banks to go 
public and list their shares on major stock exchanges. An IPO requires directors 
and managers to improve the accuracy and transparency of their financial records 
to international standards. Use of IPOs may increase bank efficiency by bringing 
market pressure to bear to maximize value, and by giving the strategic minority 
foreign owners and other investors more accurate information on which to base 
their discipline. To the extent that IPOs transfer more ownership from state 
control to private control, additional efficiency benefits are likely, given our 
results above showing the lowest efficiency for majority state-owned banks. As 
discussed above, several large state-owned banks, including three of the Big Four, 
have already engaged in IPOs that raised large amounts of capital. 
  A third mechanism through which foreign organizations may be able to 
exercise effective managerial control is by leading consortiums that take over 
majority ownership of Chinese banks. This method allows a foreign financial 
entity to act in effect as a majority owner – picking directors and senior managers 
and potentially restructuring the bank – all from a position of minority ownership. 
To illustrate, a consortium led by Citigroup recently signed a deal to take control 
of Guangdong Development bank. The consortium will have 85.6% ownership, 
with Citigroup having the limit or close to the limit of 20% for any one foreign 
investor, and IBM would hold less than 5%, so that total foreign ownership 
remains under the 25% government limit. The remaining shares would be held by 





The future growth of China’s economy may depend in important ways on the 
reform of its banking industry – reform that is currently taking place at a rapid 
rate. The most important changes are to its dominant ‘Big Four’ state-owned 
banks that control about three-fourths of the nation’s banking assets. The Chinese 
government is partially privatizing three of the Big Four, taking on minority 
foreign ownership of these institutions, and going public with some of the shares. 
The fourth is currently being restructured for likely partial privatization in the near 
future. Predicting the efficiency effects of these and other reforms is difficult 
because 1) the extant research on Chinese bank efficiency is very thin and 
contradictory; 2) there is no extant research to our knowledge on the efficiency 
effects of minority foreign ownership of banks in any nation; and 3) background 
information on the Chinese banking system is not widely known. 
  The main goals of this paper are to try to help fill in these three gaps in the 
research literature in order to help address issues of Chinese bank reform. We 
analyze profit and cost efficiency using 266 annual observations over 1994–2003 
on 38 commercial banks in China with different majority ownership – Big Four, 
non-Big Four state-owned, private domestic, and foreign. The data cover 95% of 
the commercial banking assets in the country. We emphasize the profit efficiency 
findings because profit efficiency is a more inclusive concept than cost efficiency 
– the latter neglects operating revenues and loan losses. We also examine minority 
foreign ownership of some of the non-Big Four state-owned banks and private 
domestic Chinese institutions. In addition, we provide background information on 
the history, regulation, and market environment of the Chinese banking industry. 
  Our empirical results suggest strong favorable efficiency effects from reforms 
that reduce state ownership of banks in China and increase the role of foreign 
ownership. The Big Four are by far the least profit efficient, due in large part to 
poor revenue performance and high nonperforming loans. The majority foreign 
banks are the most profit efficient, so shifting resources from state-owned banks – 
particularly the Big Four – to foreign ownership is likely to raise China’s banking 
system efficiency appreciably. 
  Our most important findings concern the effects of minority foreign 
ownership. The data are strongly consistent with efficiency gains for this type of 
foreign investment. For both efficiency concepts (profit and cost) and for both 
categories of domestic ownership that have minority foreign ownership (non-Big 
Four state-owned and private domestic), minority foreign ownership is associated 
with higher efficiency. These results are also robust to checks for selection effects. 
These checks suggest that efficiency improves after foreign investment, rather 
than just selecting efficient Chinese banks in which to invest. However, we cannot 
entirely rule out a more complex selection effect in which foreigners invest in  
31 
banks that were going to have efficiency improvements even without minority 
foreign ownership. This selection may occur because these institutions are made 
available for minority foreign ownership and/or because foreigners identify and 
target these banks. 
  We also identify several potential mechanisms through which minority 
foreign ownership may increase Chinese bank efficiency. These include 
‘leveraging’ of minority positions to improve the corporate culture and 
management of the banks; requiring or persuading the banks engage in IPOs to 
improve reporting and increase market discipline; and leading consortiums that 
take over majority ownership of Chinese banks. 
  In terms of policy implications, the very poor efficiency of Big Four banks 
and the efficiency benefits to minority foreign ownership of both non-Big Four 
state-owned banks and private domestic banks suggest that the partial 
privatization of the Big Four banks with minority foreign ownership are likely to 
improve efficiency substantially. Additional benefits may be forthcoming if other 
non-Big Four state-owned banks and private domestic banks also add foreign 
owners, although this conflicts with the practice often demonstrated by the 
Chinese government to protect its domestic institutions, particularly state-owned 
banks, from competition. In the long run, there may also be benefits in terms of 
continued growth of the Chinese economy when the excess of funds available for 
investment is not as large as it is currently. Although little more can directly 
extrapolated from the current empirical exercise, based on findings in the 
literature for other developing nations, there are likely even bigger improvements 
in efficiency forthcoming if China allows unfettered foreign majority ownership 
of current state-owned and private domestic banks, removes other remaining 
restrictions on foreign banks, and eventually totally privatizes the state-owned 
banks. The ‘real’ reward of such reforms may be continued economic growth 
because an open and flexible banking environment not only provides more credit, 
but a better allocation of credit, funding more positive net present value projects 
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